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ABSTRACT
High level automation has the ability to relieve operators from complex, working
memory-intensive tasks. When the task is primarily perceptual or cognitive in nature, the
amount taken over by the machine can be very high. However, as operators interact with
technology that is more automated (i.e., automation is higher in stage and degree), they
may become more subject to the negative effects when that technology fails. This concept
of reaping greater benefits of higher degrees of automation that is reliable but suffering
catastrophic performance consequences when it is unreliable has been termed the
lumberjack effect and has been well documented among younger adults (Endsley &
Kiris, 1995; Onnasch et al., 2013; Rovira et al., 2017). The cause of this effect is that
frequent interaction with reliable, high level automation induces a complacency or
disengagement with the task (becoming out of the loop). Thus, when that automation
fails, the user has been out of the loop (Endsley & Kiris, 1995) and is thus unprepared to
resume the task. As older adults have reduced cognitive abilities, they may be even more
subject to the lumberjack effect: benefiting greatly with reliable, high level automation
but suffering major performance decrements with unreliable automation. The purpose of
the current study was to examine the presence and magnitude of the lumberjack effect in
older adults as it has not yet been documented in the literature. Older and younger adults
interacted with various levels of automation. We replicated the finding that performance
was negatively affected on unreliable trials of automation compared to reliable trials for
both age groups (i.e., the lumberjack effect). However, this effect only appeared during
low workload conditions and did not appear to be more pronounced in older adults. These
results are the first to show that the lumberjack effect, previously observed in younger
ii

adults is equally pronounced in older adults. However, what aspect of aging cognition
was the source of this similar lumberjack effect is still an empirical question. Future work
should be done to understand methods which can help older adults stay in the loop when
using automated technology.
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INTRODUCTION
Automation is defined as a machine carrying out a function that was previously
performed by a human (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Automation may help users by
freeing them from mundane, repetitive, complex, or cognitively-demanding tasks.
However, when automation is unreliable, the user is suddenly put in the situation of
resuming manual control of a task for which they were not paying attention. A recent
example of a high-level automation failure with dire consequences was the
malfunctioning autopilot in the Boeing 737 MAX (“Pilots Warned”, 2019). The 737
MAX utilized a new auto pilot system that had not been fully tested. The plane
erroneously descended at take-off, causing an alarm in the ground proximity warning
system, another automated system, to alert. The pilot was not able to override the auto
pilot in time and resulted in the death of all 157 people on board.
Higher level automation, as discussed above, tends to alleviate the operator from
more working memory-intensive tasks such as decision making, compared to more
perceptual tasks. However, as the Boeing story illustrates, there is a tradeoff: when the
automation functions reliably, the operator has reduced working memory demand.
However, when it malfunctions, the operator is left to diagnose a problem in a situation
that they have not been attending (“out of the loop” phenomenon; OOTL) (Endsley &
Kiris, 1995). When previously reliable automation fails, and the operator is put back “into
the loop” of a complex, working memory-intensive task, performance typically suffers.
This is part of what is known as the lumberjack effect (Onnasch et al., 2014). The
lumberjack effect is the notion that when lower-levels of automation fail, the
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consequences are less severe because the operator is still relatively engaged in the task
(they were more “in the loop”). However, with higher level automation, they are more
OOTL and thus, much less able to recover when automation fails.
Types and Levels of Automation
While automation can take many forms (e.g., robots, software) it can be conceptually
described by type (what task is being automated) and level (how much of a task is being
automation. Automation can be categorized into four specific types, organized based on
stages of human information processing that each supports: (1) information acquisition;
(2) information analysis; (3) decision and action selection; (4) action implementation
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Each type exists on a continuum from levels
of low to high automation. The combination of type and level is referred to as the degree
of automation (Onnasch, 2014). The degree increases along with the level and type
automation as a linear relationship. To understand degree of automation, it is necessary to
distinguish between the four types.
The lowest and simplest type is information acquisition automation in which minimal
processing is carried out on raw sensor-based data (e.g., camera). This data is then
presented to the user, one example being a car’s backup camera. The driver is shown a
live feed of what is going on behind the car while in reverse, but there is very little
additional information. This type of automation serves to enhance the lower-level
perceptual aspects of the task being performed.
In the next more complex type, information analysis automation, raw sensor data is
processed or analyzed and presented to the user. An example of this type of automation
might be a hypothetical night vision system in a car that not only enhances the
2

information (lightens the dark image) but also overlays an artificial path to indicate the
hidden road and highlights important elements of the visual field (e.g., a deer in the road).
Because the additional processing may alleviate the requirement for attentional selection,
the user is naturally more OOTL compared to information acquisition automation.
The third type of automation, decision automation, processes and analyzes sensor
data to a greater extent and presents choices that the user can compare. Decision
automation, because of the additional analysis, alleviates a majority of the decision
making components required to complete the task. While this type of automation does
involve some processing of information, it only presents decision options to the user. A
common example of this would be Google Maps which integrates multiple factors such
as distance, means of transportation, and traffic conditions to calculate the fastest routes.
It provides multiple suggestions and indicates how much faster one route would be
compared to another, supplying additional details such as road closures and tolls, which
allows the operator to make an informed decision. The operator is still able to make the
final decision over which route to select and Google Maps will adjust its directions based
on where the operator chooses to go, whether they follow a given route or deviate from it.
Action automation is the final type where the automation fully executes a task in
place of the operator. A high level of this would be the autopilot in an airplane. A series
of sensors detects information which is processed by the autopilot computer and once
engaged, the pilot no longer has any role in the task as the plane maneuvers. The operator
has the option of disengaging the autopilot, however, at such a high degree of
automation, manual control would most likely be difficult if not impossible.
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As the degree of automation increases, more of the task is allocated to the
automation and less to the operator. Additionally, the nature of the task also changes as
type of automation increases. With higher levels of automation, more of the cognitive
components of the task are alleviated. This doesn’t necessarily reduce workload, rather, it
allows the operator to focus attentional resources elsewhere. This can be highly beneficial
in domains which require attention to be allocated to multiple stimuli simultaneously.
Automation and the Lumberjack Effect
Despite the benefits of reliable high-level automation, there are also potential
negative effects (Bainbridge, 1983) such as the out-of-the-loop phenomenon. Operators
who are out-of-the-loop for an extended period may experience skill degradation, loss of
situation awareness, and increased complacency (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens,
2000; Wickens et al., 1992). These consequences are only detrimental to performance
when the automation fails and the operator must resume the task. Importantly, the level of
the automation (i.e., amount of the task being assumed by automation) determines the
consequences of failures such that failures of low-level automation may be of low
magnitude while failures of high-level require cognitive effort for users to get back “inthe-loop.” For example, malfunctions of a voice dictation system (a low-level system),
which automates the well-learned skill of typing, merely requires users to resume typing,
whereas failures of lane-keeping automation in a car (a high-level system) require
operators to recognize the vehicles speed, location in the roadway, and proximity to
potential hazards prior in order to safely take-over manual control of the vehicle.
The paradoxical notion that reliable high-level automation is extremely helpful to
human performance but unreliable high-level automation is extremely detrimental to
4

human performance defines the lumberjack effect. Essentially, high-level automation can
substantially reduce the amount of working memory demand that would otherwise be
placed on the operator, allowing for cognitive resources to be freed and allocated to
alternative tasks or stimuli. Unfortunately, when automation failure occurs, the operator
is forced to quickly resume the task they were not attending to, thus regaining the
working memory demand that was previously alleviated. This rapid switch from
automated operation to manual control can lead to a sharp decline in task performance.
Given that the sources of the lumberjack effect seem to be a) the unique cognitive
properties of higher-levels of automation, which support more cognitive tasks, and b) the
general difficulty of working-memory-intensive tasks, it is reasonable that individuals
with diminished working memory capacity, such as older adults, may exhibit a stronger
lumberjack effect.
Older Adults and Automated Technology
Automation can be particularly beneficial to older adults who may experience
age-related declines in many physical and cognitive abilities (e.g., Salthouse, 1994;
Salthouse, 1996; Dobbs & Rule, 1990; Rybash et al., 1995). Given that the source of the
lumberjack effect seems to be tied to working memory demands , studies using varying
degrees of automation should show a relatively large lumberjack effect in older adults.
However, this has not been the case. Pak et al. (2016) found that when automation was
reliable, as expected, older adults’ performance was enhanced. However, they did not
observe a performance decrease when automation failed, as was expected. That is, they
did not seem to observe a lumberjack effect in older adults.
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There are some possible reasons that this study did not show a lumberjack effect,
despite it being a well-supported phenomenon. First, the authors held workload constant
at a low level so participants might have been able to easily recover from failure without
the use of automation. Second, Pak et al. (2016) only used two levels of automation
(information analysis, medium-decision). Recall that high level automation alleviates
working memory demands more than lower levels. By using a moderate level of
automation, participants, young and old, may have been able to easily recover from
automation failure because manual calculation was relatively uncomplicated.
Implementing a higher level of decision automation may increase OOTL effects, thus
illustrating an increased lumberjack effect. Third, this task was carried out in a military
domain which may not be familiar to many civilians. Performance could have been
affected by the relative novelty of the domain if it was distracting or disorienting. If
participants were not comfortable interacting with the system, they might have been more
inclined to rely on themselves as opposed to the automation.
Current Study
For the present study, we address these possible explanations to examine older
adults use of automation. First, the most significant aspect of our study compared to Pak
et al. (2016) is that we include a condition with an even higher level of automation. We
expect that this higher degree will take the participant even more out of the loop, thus
increasing the lumberjack effect. Second, in contrast to other studies (Rovira et al., 2017;
Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007; Pak et al., 2016), we are utilizing a more
conventional, civilian task domain. We predict that civilian participants might not have
been accustomed to looking at terrain or had previous knowledge of UAVs. This could
6

have led to confusion and a lower likelihood of utilizing the automation aid. We
anticipate that the use of taxis instead of UAVs will clear up any distraction or
disorientation that may have resulted from the previous task domain. Third, we are
manipulating workload, unlike Pak et al., (2016) who kept workload consistent
throughout. We suspect that low task load (not enough working memory demand on the
participant) may have been the reason they did not observe a lumberjack effect.
Manipulating workload and increasing the degree of automation should allow us to more
precisely control the working memory demand of the task.
The purpose of the current study was to examine how the lumberjack effect
manifests in older adults. Recent findings have shown that lower working memory
capacity is related to lower task performance (Rovira et al., 2017). Given that high-level
automation alleviates working memory demand and older adults tend to have reduced
working memory capacities, the consequences of unreliable automation may be even
greater. Additionally, working memory can be taxed by increasing workload demands.
This increase in workload has been shown to negatively impact task performance in
younger and older adults (McBride et al., 2011). Our hypotheses were generated by
drawing from these findings from the older adult literature as well as the broader
automation literature (e.g., Onnasch et al., 2014; Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens,
2000; Endsley & Kiris, 1995).
1. Consistent with previous literature, we expect:
a. Older adults will exhibit lower performance compared to younger adults.
b. High workload will hinder performance more than low workload.
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c. Increasing degree of reliable automation will enhance performance.
d. Reliable automation will lead to better performance than unreliable
automation.
2. We expect that compared to younger adults, older adults’ performance will interact
with reliability. Specifically, we anticipate that performance will decrease with
unreliable automation and increase with reliable automation as degree of automation
increases.
3. We expect that, compared to younger adults, older adults’ performance will interact
with workload and degree of automation. Specifically, we anticipate that performance
will decrease as degree of automation increases under high workload compared to
low workload.
METHOD
Participants
Forty three community-dwelling older adults (22 females; Mage = 72.2, SD = 3.37)
were recruited and compensated $20 for their time. Forty four college students (29
females; Mage = 18.8, SD = 1.39) were recruited from the Clemson University participant
pool and compensated with course credit in exchange for their participation. Data from 4
participants were excluded from analyses (3 older adults and 1 younger adult) because
their performance was lower than the requisite score of 85% on the math portion of the
working memory task.
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Materials
Equipment. PC-compatible (Windows 7) computers running at 3.2 GHz with 4GB
of RAM was used with a 19-inch LCD monitor set at a resolution of 1024 x 1280 pixels.
Participants sat approximately 18 inches from the monitor, using a mouse (on the
preferred side) and a keyboard.
Taxi dispatching task. The task was adapted from previous studies (Rovira et al.,
2017; Rovira, McGarry, and Parasuraman 2007; Pak et al., 2017). The task screen was
split into four parts: a street map with a grid overlay (right), a target input area which
contained automated assistance (left), and a communication module (upper-left). The
map display depicted customers (green boxes C1 to C6 for high workload; C1 to C3 for
low workload), taxis (red boxes T1 to T6 for high workload; T1 to T3 for low workload),
one headquarters (orange box labeled HQ) and three extraneous boxes (yellow boxes B1
to B3). The primary task was to observe the map and dispatch the taxi/customer pairing
which were closest in proximity to one another. If two sets of customers and taxis were
equidistant from each other, the pair closest to HQ took priority.
Participants dispatched taxis by selecting a customer and taxi from the target input
area. To assist participants in the task, three conditions were created: a lower level
information analysis automation aid (Figure 1), a medium-level decision automation aid
(Figure 2), and a high-level decision automation aid (Figure 3). For the information
analysis automation condition, a dispatching selection chart provided an unordered list of
the distances from customer to taxi and customer to HQ. The list relieved the operator
from having to manually calculate the distances between each taxi and customer.
However, the level was still considered low because the list of distances was unordered.
9

The operator was still required to visually search through all the numbers and retain the
lowest value in working memory while comparing it to all other values in the list. This
particular task could be effortful for the operator to complete. The medium-decision
automation condition calculated the distances and provided the closest three
customer/taxi pairs to the participant in an ordered list. This alleviated working memory
demand by reducing the number of options and ordering them from best to worst. The
medium-decision automation was considered a comparatively higher degree of
automation because the task it completed was more complex and the automation took
over more of the task than the information automation. The participant was not given the
distances but they could choose to “view distance calculations”, “select best” or disregard
the automation. The high-decision automation performed the same task as the mediumdecision automation except it presented the top choice instead of the top three. This is
considered the highest level of decision automation because it only provided the
participant with one option. For each condition, the next trial began if the participant
either made a selection or did not make a selection within the allotted amount of time.
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Figure 1. Information analysis automation, high workload. All taxi (T) and customer (C)
distances are calculated and presented in an unordered list.
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Figure 2. Medium-decision automation, high workload. All taxi to customer distances are
calculated and the top 3 choices are presented to the participant.

12

Figure 3. High-decision automation, high workload. All taxi to customer distances are calculated
and the top choice is presented to the participant.
A secondary task was included because the effects of automation on performance
and complacency are most often seen in multitasking situations (Parasuraman & Manzey,
2010). For this communications task, participants were instructed to monitor the
communications panel (upper left) looking for a particular call sign which appeared every
6 seconds. If the specified call sign appeared, they are required to click the “ANSWER”
button. This secondary task was performed during each block, there was no single task
condition.
Measures
Working memory. Working memory span was measured using the automated
operation span task (OSPAN), a computerized version of the operation span memory task
(Unsworth et al. 2005). The OSPAN was chosen because it is a highly reliable measure
13

and automated so there was little need for researcher intervention while participants were
in the lab. The OSPAN asks participants to complete simple math problems while
remembering the order of letters that are being presented to them between each problem.
Individual differences and trust. Preexisting individual differences in attitudes
toward automation were measured with the automation-induced complacency potential
(AICP) scale (Merritt et al., 2019). AICP consists of 10 items on a five-point scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The primary focus is on trust in
various forms of automation, including assessments of relative reliability between
automated and human assistants. We also used the Complacency Potential Rating Scale
(CPRS) (Mollay, Parasuraman, & Singh, 1993) as an additional, more traditional,
measure of complacency potential. History-based trust was measured after each block by
posing four questions adapted from Lee and Moray (1994) (see Appendix A).
Participants answered using a 0-100 visual analogue scale, where higher scores indicated
higher perceived trust. Subjective workload was also measured after each block using the
NASA-TLX subjective workload scale (see Appendix B). This index measures subjective
workload using 6 items, each assessing a different attribute of workload: perceived
mental demand, perceived physical demand, perceived temporal demand, perceived
effort, perceived performance, and perceived frustration. Composite scores are produced
by taking a weighted average of the 6 items.
Attentional Control. Attentional control information was gathered as an
exploratory variable from younger adults only. Attentional control was measured using a
custom, PC-based version of the anti-saccade task based on Draheim, Mashburn, Martin,
and Engle (2019). The main feature of this kind of attentional control task was its use of
14

accuracy rather than reaction time (Draheim et al. 2019). Participants were instructed to
focus on a fixation point in the middle of the screen. They were then informed that a
stimulus would flash on either the right or left side of the screen and a letter would appear
on the opposite side. Their goal was to suppress the automatic saccade toward the
flashing stimulus in order to perceive the letter, which they reported on the following
screen.
Procedure
The experiment used a 3 (degree of automation: information analysis, mediumdecision, high-decision) x 2 (workload: low, high) x 2 (age: younger, older) mixedfactorial design. Participants completed six blocks of 50 trials for a total of 300 trials. The
automation reliability was set at 80% (Wickens & Dixon, 2007), therefore, in each block,
10 trials provided incorrect assistance. For the information analysis automation
conditions, the display showed incorrect distances between customers and taxis. For the
medium-decision automation conditions, the best three pairings were incorrect. For the
high-decision automation conditions, the single option presented to the participant was
incorrect. There were no automation failures before the 10th trial to establish trust in the
automation (Wickens, Hellenberg, & Xu, 2002). The subsequent automation errors were
randomly distributed among the remaining trials for each block. The participant
continued to the next trial once they submitted their pairing or after 13 seconds elapsed or
20 for older adults (Pak et al., 2016), whichever comes first. Each block contained either
information analysis, medium-decision, or high-decision automation and blocks was
randomized for each participant. Workload was manipulated by the number of pairs of
taxis and customers presented on the screen, three pairs for low workload and six pairs
15

for high (Rovira et al., 2017). The main dependent variable was task performance, a.k.a
decision accuracy, which was calculated as a ratio of how many trials each participant
chose the correct answer compared to the total number of trials. Participants were run in
groups of up to 5 at a time on individual computers with partitions between each person
to avoid potential distractions. Participants signed the informed consent and immediately
completed the working memory task outlined above. Once each participant completed
these tests, they were shown instructions for using the taxi dispatching simulator. They
were told that automation was present for all of the conditions but that it was not
perfectly reliable. Once any questions were answered concerning the task, participants
completed 12 practice trials composed of 4 information analysis, 4 medium-decision, and
4 high-decision conditions at a low workload. The participants completed the taxi
dispatching task allowing for short breaks between blocks when necessary.
RESULTS
An a priori power analysis determined that a sample of 53 participants would be
required to detect a large effect size (f = 0.50) with 90% power (α = .05). Before
conducting analyses, 4 participants were excluded (3 older adults, 1 younger adult)
because they scored below 85% on the math portion of the working memory test. Data
from 83 participants was used for analysis. Multiple imputation was performed due to
missing data. Outlier analyses were conducted but no participants were removed because
their data did not appear to influence the results of the statistical analyses. Participant
descriptive statistics are outlined in Table 1. Independent sample t-tests demonstrated no
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significant differences in CPRS, AICP, or NASA-TLX scores between older and younger
adults (p >.05) (see Appendix C).
Table 1
Participant characteristics by age group including means and standard deviations for age in
years, complacency potential rating scale (CPRS) ratings, and automation induced complacency
potential (AICP) ratings.
Younger Adults

Older Adults

Male

Female

Male

Female

(n = 13)

(n = 30)

(n = 17)

(n = 23)

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Age

19.15

1.41

18.60

1.38

72.59

3.61

71.87

3.22

CPRS

64.77

5.73

63.97

5.67

61.47

4.24

62.57

5.38

AICP

33.38

5.27

30.57

3.94

34.88

3.97

32.13

4.79

Note. All statistics represent data from 83 participants. CPRS scores range from 50 to 77 such
that higher scores indicate higher complacency potential. AICP scores range from 21to 45and
should be interpreted in the same fashion as CPRS.
All variables were checked for normality prior to statistical tests. The normality check
revealed multiple variables violated the normality assumption. Therefore, we utilized
conservative estimates for the following analyses.
Subjective Workload
We measured subjective workload to help affirm that our workload manipulation was
successful (i.e., low workload conditions were perceived as such than high workload
conditions). Unfortunately, some data were lost due technology errors so analyses were
conducted on smaller sample sets. We expected that subjective workload ratings would
be higher for high workload conditions and lower for low workload conditions. A
repeated measures ANOVA revealed no main effects of workload or automation
(Appendix D). We expect that differences may not have manifested in these ratings
17

because of automation use. Specifically, subjective workload ratings may have been
lower if automation helped relieve workload demands when completing the task.
Trust and Automation
We did not have any specific hypotheses concerning trust, however, we were
interested in exploring whether there were differences in trust across workload or
automation conditions. Analyses showed there was a main effect of degree of automation
(F (2,81) = 26.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .249) but not a main effect of workload (F (2,81) =
12.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .241). The interaction between the two variables was also
significant (F (2,81) = 6.55, p < .001,ηp2 = .241). Post-hoc analyses showed that trust was
significantly lower for information analysis (M = 40.14, SD = 15.21) conditions
compared to medium-decision conditions (M = 47.70, SD = 15.65); (t (82) = 5.87, p <
.001). Trust was also significantly lower under information analysis conditions compared
to high-decision conditions (M = 48.39, SD = 17.01); (t (82) = 5.66, p < 0.001). These
results are shown below in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Trust as a function of workload across degrees of automation. Participants answered
using a 0-100 visual analogue scale, where higher scores indicated higher perceived trust.
Working Memory Differences and Age
To determine whether there were age-related differences in working memory
capacity, we compared working memory scores between the younger and older adults.
Working memory capacity was measured using the OSPAN task. Scores were calculated
by first identifying each set of perfectly recalled letter strings and summing the number of
letters in those strings producing scores between 0 and 75. We performed outlier analyses
and no scores were excluded. Consistent with the literature, there was a significant effect
of age group on working memory score, (t (83) = 2.74, p = .008), with younger adults (M
= 33.70, SD = 19.15) demonstrating higher working memory capacity scores compared to
older adults (M = 23.00, SD = 16.35) (see Appendix E). The following analysis compares
performance between younger and older adults to determine if older adults exhibit a
19

greater performance decrement with unreliable automation compared to younger adults
(i.e. the lumberjack effect).
To investigate the role of working memory in task performance, we correlated
working memory capacity with performance on the main taxi dispatching task across all
workload and automation conditions. Analyses were conducted separately for younger
and older adults. For younger adults, there were significant correlations between working
memory and performance in high workload (r (42) = .317, p = .038), medium-decision (r
(42) = .304, p = .048) and high-decision (r (42) = .342, p = .025) conditions. For older
adults, there were no significant correlations between working memory and task
performance. This indicates that for younger adults, performance was better for those
with higher working memory in certain conditions. However, for older adults,
performance did not appear to have a relationship with working
Task Time Between Age Groups
We measured task time in order to see whether there were completion time
differences between older and younger adults. Additionally, we wanted to investigate
whether the task time took longer depending on workload or automation condition. There
was a main effect of workload (F (2,79) = 30.38, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.278) but there was
not a main effect of degree of automation (p > .05). The interaction between workload
and age group was also not significant. On average, younger adults took significantly less
time than older adults to complete the task (t (81) = 13.46, p < .001). (see Appendix F).
Additional analyses of task time are illustrated in Appendix H.
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Secondary Task Performance
Analyses were first conducted to ensure that performance on the secondary task
was not significantly different across workload or automation conditions. Differences
could indicate a speed/accuracy tradeoff. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted
and found a main effect for automation (F (2,72) = 6.46, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.306) but not
for workload (F (1,73) = .137, p = .712, ηp2 = .002). Post-hoc analyses showed that
performance was significantly lower during medium-decision automation conditions (M
= .53, SD = .28) compared to low automation conditions (M = .59, SD = .28); (t (86) =
3.12, p = .002). Performance was also significantly higher for high-decision conditions
(M = .60, SD = .29) compared to medium-decision conditions (M = .53, SD = .28); (t (86)
= 5.337, p < .001). Despite these statistical differences, there does not appear to be a
drastic tradeoff between speed and accuracy based on secondary task performance.
Taxi Dispatching Task and Decision Accuracy
To investigate whether there was a difference in performance between age groups
(hypothesis 1), we conducted a 2 (age group: younger or older) x 3 (degree of
automation: information or medium-decision or high-decision) x 2 (workload: low or
high) x 2 (reliability: reliable or unreliable) repeated measures ANOVA. There was not a
significant interaction between age group and any of the other three variables so the
following effects summarize data for all participants. There was a main effect for
workload (hypothesis 1a) (F (2,80) = 103.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .561), degree of automation
(hypothesis 1b) (F (2,80) = 8.00, p = .001, ηp2 = .167), and reliability (hypothesis 1c) (F
(1,81) = 36.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .308). These main effects were qualified by a significant 3-
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way interaction between DOA, workload, and reliability (F (2,80) = 32.72, p < .001, ηp2
= .450).
The source of the 3-way interaction, illustrated in Figures 5 and 6, was a
significant 2-way interaction between reliability and degree of automation within the low
workload conditions (F (2,81) = 30.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .432) but not within high workload
conditions (hypothesis 2). There was not a significant interaction between workload and
degree of automation (hypothesis 3) (p > .05). For low workload conditions, when
automation was reliable, individuals’ performance was higher during medium-decision
automation trials (M = .78, SD = .10) compared to information analysis automation trials
(M = .692, SD = .164), (t (82) = 4.61, p < .001) and even higher during high-decision
automation trials (M = .875, SD = .009), (t (82) = 8.72, p < .001). That is, performance
significantly increased with each increasing degree of automation when the aid was
reliable. When automation was unreliable, however, performance was significantly worse
during high-decision automation trials (M = .643, SD = .029), (t (82) = 4.37, p < .001)
compared to medium-decision (M = .75, SD = .26) and information analysis trials (M =
.73, SD = .19), (t (82) = 3.04, p < .001).
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Figure 5. Mean decision accuracy as a function of degree of automation and reliability for low
workload conditions as a proportion. Error bars display +/- 1 standard error.
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Figure 6. Mean decision accuracy as a function of degree of automation and reliability for high
workload conditions as a proportion. Error bars display +/- 1 standard error.

A lumberjack effect would appear as a significant increase in performance with
reliable automation and a significant performance decrease with unreliable automation
across increasing degrees of automation.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current study was to investigate how the lumberjack effect
manifested in younger adults compared to older adults. Hypothesis 1a posited that older
adults’ performance would be lower compared to younger adults. This was not supported,
there was no main effect of age. Next, we hypothesized that performance would be better
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under low workload conditions compared to high workload conditions (1b). This
hypothesis was supported. Hypothesis 1c expected that performance would improve
across increasing degree of reliable automation. This hypothesis was supported. Finally,
we expected that reliable automation would lead to better performance compared to
unreliable automation. This hypothesis was supported. To summarize these initial
findings, there was not a main effect of age but there was a significant main effect of
workload, reliability, and degree of automation.
Next, we hypothesized that 2) older adults would exhibit a greater lumberjack
effect compared to younger adults. That is, we expected that performance would
significantly decrease with unreliable automation and increase with reliable automation
and this effect would be stronger for older adults. Though we saw a lumberjack effect for
both age groups, there was not an increased effect for older adults. Therefore, our
hypothesis was not supported. This finding contributes to the literature by demonstrating
a lumberjack effect in older adults which has not previously been shown. While our older
adults did indeed have reduced working memory compared to younger adults, they were
not more detrimentally affected. This suggests that the source of the lumberjack effect
observed in other studies may have been caused by a factor other than working memory.
This finding warrants future investigation into cognitive sources of the lumberjack effect.
Finally, we hypothesized that 3) compared to younger adults, older adults’
performance would decrease with increasing degree of automation under high workload
compared to low workload. Again, there was no main effect of age and age group did not
significantly interact with any other variable. We found that performance in high workload
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conditions was not impacted more than low workload conditions by high-degree automation. This
hypothesis was not supported.

The most surprising finding of this study was that there was not a significant
difference in performance between younger and older adults. We expect that this was due
to the specific cognitive demands of the task. For example, McBride et al. (2011)
demonstrated performance differences between younger and older adults while
completing two concurrent tasks, one of which utilized automation. The first task
required participants to conduct a visual search under time pressure, unaided by
automation. They completed a concurrent task which involved alerting automation which
is a low level automation and thus requires close operator monitoring. Since this task
involved a more simplistic form of automation, cognitive demands placed on participants
was much higher than the task used in the current study. Thus, we would not expect to
see a significant performance decrement associated with working memory capacity (i.e.,
normative age-related changes in cognition). Additionally, we saw that older adults on
average took a significantly longer time complete the taxi dispatching task compared to
younger adults (see Appendix H). This increase in response time could have helped close
the performance gap between the two age groups, sacrificing speed for accuracy. Finally,
we also observed lower performance on the secondary task for older adults compared to
younger adults (see Appendix J). This lowered monitoring could have also played a role
in helping older adults close the performance gap with younger adults. That is, reduced
monitoring of the secondary task would allow for more cognitive resources to be
allocated to the taxi dispatching task, thus potentially improving performance.
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This study demonstrated a lumberjack effect in the lower workload conditions
(increase in performance with reliable automation along with a performance decrement
with unreliable automation). However, we did not observe a change in performance for
the high workload conditions from the lowest to highest DOA. The finding that
performance did not change under high workload conditions across reliability conditions
does not support the findings in Rovira et al., (2017). They found a performance
decrement under high workload conditions using unreliable automation. We suspect that
these discrepancies were due to differences in our sample populations. Their sample
involved cadets performing a similar task to ours using a UAV simulator. Participants
may have been more comfortable completing the task in that particular domain because
of their experience at a military institution. Our findings showed no significant
differences in performance across DOA indicating that the high workload made the task
too difficult for our sample of participants. Pak et al., (2016) did not observe a
lumberjack effect under the same level of workload. However, we suspect that we were
able to observe a lumberjack effect because we used a higher degree of automation which
is necessary to induce OOTL effects (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2000). In
summary, implementing higher workload conditions did not have the intended effect on
performance but the addition of a higher DOA condition did produce a lumberjack effect.
Previous literature has noted the critical boundary as degree of automation moves
from information acquisition and information analysis to decision selection (Onnasch et
al., 2014). This is the point where consequences from OOTL effects begin to manifest
(Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2000; Endsley & Kiris, 1995). The current study
adds to the literature by demonstrating a gradual decrease in performance once the
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boundary point is crossed. That is, we did not observe a performance decrement from
unreliable information analysis to medium-decision automation but the effect was
observed when comparing the high-decision condition. This adds to the body of empirical
evidence which demonstrates a performance along with a workload and situation
awareness tradeoff (e.g., Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Onnasch et al., 2014; Pak et al., 2016;
Rovira et al., 2017) (Appendix G). That is, as degree of automation increases so does loss
of situation awareness. Operator workload also decreases as the automation adopts more
of the task. There lies a theoretical point at which this tradeoff is no longer beneficial to
the operator and task performance suffers. Research on these relationships should
continue across domains and types of automation technologies.
Limitations and Future Directions
One major limitation of this study was that there was no control condition present.
It could have been informative to have a condition with no automated assistant present so
that participants would have to complete the task with only manual control. Many studies
include a manual control condition in order to understand the costs and benefits of
implementing automation (Onnasch et al., 2014). Future studies investigating
performance with unreliable automation should implement this methodology.
This study did not demonstrate a relationship between working memory and task
performance despite recent literature supporting the connection between higher working
memory and better task performance in older adults (Rovira et al., 2017). This may be
explained by the unique cognitive demands of this particular task. The need for
information maintenance in the presence of interference is viewed as the key link
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between working memory and high-order cognitive ability (Engle & Krane, 2002).
Though the task in this study required a certain level of information maintenance and
included interference (a secondary task), the demand may not have been sufficient to
demonstrate working memory differences. Average performance scores on the secondary
task were at most, .59, meaning that on average, participants did not interact with the
secondary task more than 59% of the time for those conditions. Therefore, if the
interference was not intrusive enough, we would not expect working memory to
necessarily be predictive of performance.
Further research should be done to investigate the relationship between agerelated changes in cognitive abilities and performance with various levels of imperfect
automation.
Conclusion
The results of this study reinforce previous findings about the detrimental effects
of using imperfect automation on performance (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2000;
Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Onnasch et al., 2013; Rovira et al., 2017). This study is the first to
demonstrate a lumberjack effect in older adults. Interestingly, we did not observe
degraded performance in older adults. However, workload seemed to have a significant
effect on performance across age groups. This study emphasizes the effect that increased
workload can have on an operator’s performance. Automation has been a driving force
for innovation in many industries (e.g., aviation, healthcare, transportation) but
implemented poorly, can play a part in catastrophe (e.g., Boeing 737 MAX). Operator

29

workload should be a critical consideration when implementing automated systems
across any domain.
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APPENDICES
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Appendix A

Figure 7. History-based trust questionnaire adapted from Lee and Moray (1994).
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Appendix B

Figure 8. NASA-TLX measure of subjective workload (Hart & Staveland, 1988).
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Appendix C
Table 2
Mean scores for AICP, CPRS, and NASA-TLX for younger and older adults.
Younger Adults

Older Adults

(n = 43)

(n = 40)

M

SD

M

SD

t

df

AICP

31.42

4.51

3.30

4.61

1.88

81

CPRS

64.21

5.63

62.10

4.89

1.82

81

NASA-TLX (low workload)

50.65

11.77

54.61

10.59

1.59

79

NASA-TLX (high workload)

49.70

12.06

53.82

11.89

1.54

79

*p < .05
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Appendix D

Figure 9. Mean ratings of subjective workload ranging from 0-100 (NASA-TLX) (Hart &
Staveland, 1988). Error bars display +/- 1 standard error.
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Appendix E

Figure 10. Mean working memory differences between younger and older adults based on the
OSPAN task (0-75). Error bars display +/- 1 standard error.
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Appendix F

Figure 11. Response time as a function of degree of automation and workload for older adults.
Error bars display +/- 1 standard error.
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Figure 12. Response time as a function of degree of automation and workload for younger adults.
Error bars display +/- 1 standard error.
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Appendix G

Figure 10. Tradeoff of variables, with degree of automation (Wickens et al., 2010)
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Appendix H
Analyses of task time data did not include “timed out” trials. That is, trials where
participants did not provide a response were excluded from analyses. These types of trials
constituted less than 5% of the original data set. To investigate the differences in task
time between age groups across conditions, we first conducted a 2 (age group: younger or
older) x 3 (degree of automation: information or medium-decision or high-decision) x 2
(workload: low or high) x 2 (reliability: reliable or unreliable) repeated measures
ANOVA. There was no significant interaction involving age group. However, we
conducted independent samples t-tests to determine which conditions had significant
differences in task time between older and younger adults. These results are outlined in
table 3. Older adults exhibited higher task times compared to younger adults in every
condition. Analyses also showed that, on average, reaction times were longer for
unreliable trials (M = 5610.5, SD = 1243.1) compared to reliable trials (M = 5471.4, SD =
1019.3) for younger adults, (t (43) = 2.38, p = .022). For older adults, reaction times
were, on average, also longer for unreliable trials (M = 9495.0, SD = 1587.7) compared to
reliable trials (M = 9223.3, SD = 1314.8); (t (40) = 2.38, p = .010). This shows that both
older and younger adults, on average, took longer to decide on the optimal pairing when
automation was unreliable compared to when it was reliable and older adults tended to
take longer to provide an answer than younger adults.
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Table 3
Independent sample t-tests between age groups comparing response times across all conditions
broken down by automation reliability (unreliable or reliable), degree of automation (IA:
information analysis, MD: medium decision, or HD: high decision) and workload (low or high)
in milliseconds.

Unreliable, IA Automation, Low Workload
Unreliable, IA Automation, High Workload
Unreliable, MD Automation, Low Workload
Unreliable, MD Automation, High Workload
Unreliable, HD Automation, Low Workload
Unreliable, HD Automation, High Workload
Reliable, IA Automation, Low Workload
Reliable, IA Automation, High Workload
Reliable, MD Automation, Low Workload
Reliable, MD Automation, High Workload
Reliable, HD Automation, Low Workload
Reliable, HD Automation, High Workload
*p < .05. ** p < .001

Younger Adults
M
SD
5099.5 1399.4
6276.7 1720.6
5630.8 1477.1
6007.3 1717.8
5152.6 1571.9
5495.8 1543.9
5280.7 1309.4
5767.5 1473.0
5612.1 1279.3
6090.9 1402.3
4827.1 1129.9
5249.7 1262.3

Older Adults
M
SD
8742.4
1828.4
10147.6 1422.3
9059.6
2424.6
9963.0
2343.0
9270.3
2092.2
9787.4
2301.8
9210.1
1877.0
8415.3
1558.4
9157.1
1781.5
9838.2
1843.7
8557.9
1404.9
9161.1S 1665.5

t-test
-10.138**
-11.201**
-7.711**
-8.718**
-10.079**
-9.901**
-10.985**
-10.940**
-10.346**
-10.365**
-13.270**
-11.991**

The repeated measures ANOVA also indicated a significant 3-way interaction
between reliability, degree of automation, and workload. There was not a significant
interaction with age so analyses were collapsed across age groups. The source of the 3way interaction, illustrated in Appendix I, was a significant 2-way interaction between
reliability and degree of automation within the low workload conditions (F (2,81) =
14.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .263) but not within high workload conditions. There was not a
significant interaction between workload and degree of automation (p > .05). For low
workload conditions, when automation was reliable, mean response times were lower
during high-decision automation trials (M = 7174.4, SD = 2540.9) compared to
information analysis automation trials (M = 7174.4, SD = 2540.9), (t (82) = 3.07, p =
.003) and also compared to medium-decision automation trials (M = 7320.5, SD =
2350.2), (t (82) = 4.26, p < .001). That is, response times significantly decreased with
high-decision automation compared to the other two conditions when automation was
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reliable. When automation was unreliable, however, response times did not change
significantly from information analysis trials to high-decision.
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Appendix I

Figure 11. Mean response time as a function of degree of automation and reliability for low workload
conditions as a proportion. Error bars display +/- 1 standard error.
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Figure 12. Mean response time as a function of degree of automation and reliability for high workload
conditions as a proportion. Error bars display +/- 1 standard error.
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Appendix J
Table 4
Independent sample t-tests between age groups comparing secondary task performance broken
down by automation reliability (unreliable or reliable), degree of automation (IA: information
analysis, MD: medium decision, or HD: high decision) and workload (low or high) as a
proportion (0 - .1).

Unreliable, IA Automation, High Workload
Unreliable, MD Automation, Low Workload
Reliable, IA Automation, Low Workload
Reliable, IA Automation, High Workload
Reliable, MD Automation, High Workload
Reliable, HD Automation, Low Workload
Reliable, HD Automation, High Workload
*p < .05. ** p < .001

Younger Adults
M
SD
.67
.30
.67
.36
.66
.25
.66
.24
.61
.24
.64
.25
.69
.23
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Older Adults
M
SD
.52
.34
.49
.38
.53
.29
.55
.29
.47
.27
.52
.29
.56
.28

t-test
2.09*
2.11*
2.09*
2.72*
2.64*
2.05*
2.36*
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